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Samson v. California: "Evil" Suspicionless




On September 6, 2002, Officer Alex Rohleder of the San
Bruno Police Department arrested Donald Samson for drug
possession.1  Officer Rohleder had searched Donald Samson
without any suspicion of wrongdoing because he knew that
Samson was on parole, with parole conditions requiring
submission to suspicionless searches by police officers. 2 During
the search, Officer Rohleder found Samson in possession of
methamphetamines. 3 The United States Supreme Court applied
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test and upheld
the search.4  The Court held that suspicionless searches of
parolees permitted by state statute are constitutionally reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and that California's ban of
"arbitrary, capricious or harassing"5  suspicionless searches
provided sufficient protection of a parolee's diminished expectation
of privacy.6
In a significant footnote, the Court indicated that it was not
deciding Samson's case under the "special needs" doctrine. 7 An
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., University of
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1. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006) [hereinafter Samson
1]; People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
2004) [hereinafter Samson 11].
2. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2196. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West
2000) ("Any inmate who is eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter
shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other
peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and
with or without cause.").
3. Samson II, supra note 1, at *1.
4. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2202.
5. Samson II, supra note 1, at *2 (citing California v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 449
(Cal. 1998)).
6. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2202.
7. Id. at 2199 n.3.
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application of the special needs doctrine more than likely would
have changed the outcome of Samson.8 In order to engage in a
reasonableness balancing analysis, this doctrine would have
required the Court to. find that the regime of suspicionless
searches upheld in Samson satisfied a special government need
beyond the regular need for law enforcement. 9
This Article first argues that the Court should have applied
the special needs doctrine when deciding Donald Samson's case.
This Article proposes that a suspicionless search of a parolee by a
police officer does not qualify as a special need under this doctrine.
This Article then argues that even if the Court had found a special
need for police officers to search parolees without individualized
suspicion, the search should have failed under the Court's
reasonableness balancing calculus. The Court should have found
that parolees are reasonably protected from suspicionless
searches. Finally, this Article concludes with several alternatives
the Court could have considered that better satisfy the special
needs doctrine and the reasonableness balancing calculus.
I. The Special Needs Exception and Reasonableness
Balancing
A. General Fourth Amendment Principles
In order to find that a person's Fourth Amendment privacy
rights have been violated, a court first must determine that a
search has occurred.10 The party claiming that an
unconstitutional search has occurred must then show that the
search intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. 1
Justice Harlan articulated the test for determining a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United
States.12 He stated that first, "a person [must] have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
8. See id. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (indicating that the Court should not engage in reasonableness
balancing until it has found a special need).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. See id.
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expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 13
Once a person has established a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Fourth Amendment normally protects that
expectation from intrusion by requiring that authorities show
"probable cause" in order to perform a search or seizure. 14 The
Court defines "probable cause" as a showing that "there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place."15 Authorities usually show probable cause by
obtaining a warrant before conducting a search.1 6 The probable
cause and warrant requirements are "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 17 These
exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn,"8 and the party
seeking an exception must show that "the exigencies of the
situation [have] made that course imperative." 19
B. The Special Needs Doctrine: Warrantless Searches
Justified By Legitimate Needs Beyond Law Enforcement
The special needs doctrine provides an exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 20 The Court has employed the special needs doctrine
to justify suspicionless searches 21 and searches performed on
13. Id.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
18. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
19. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). The Court stated the
following concerning the history and exceptions of the warrant requirement:
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their
own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the
absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek
exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.
Id. at 455-56.
20. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15 (2001).
21. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding
the random drug testing of high school student athletes based on the school's
special needs of maintaining order and preventing drug addiction among student
athletes); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(allowing for suspicionless drug testing of certain U.S. Customs Service employees
because these searches fulfilled a special government need of ensuring that these
employees, who often had contact with illegal drugs, were not using illegal drugs).
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reasonable grounds.22 In order to use the special needs doctrine to
bypass the warrant requirement, the government must show
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that]
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable."23 Only in these "exceptional circumstances... is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers."24 In other words, if a court determines that a special
need beyond law enforcement is not present to justify a
warrantless search, it should hold the search unconstitutional. 25
The Court does not "simply accept the State's invocation of a
'special need.' 26 When analyzing a government assertion of a
special need, the Court should perform a "close review" of the
purported need. 27 For example, in Ferguson v. Charleston, the
plaintiffs claimed that the city police had unreasonably searched
them without suspicion of any wrongdoing. The police were
following a search policy that they had implemented in
cooperation with the local hospital.28 Concerned about an increase
in cocaine use among pregnant women, members of the hospital
staff agreed to cooperate with the local police force in testing
pregnant women for illegal drug use and prosecuting pregnant
women if they tested positive. 29 The search policy set forth
procedures for identifying and testing pregnant women for
suspected drug use, contained police procedures and criteria for
arresting patients who tested positive, and prescribed prosecution
for drug offenses or child neglect.30 In its analysis of the case, the
Court focused on the search policy's incorporation of police
operational guidelines and attention to chain of custody, possible
22. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upholding the search of
a probationer's home based on reasonable grounds for suspicion because the state
had a special need to monitor probationers).
23. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. Id.; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (recognizing that
the category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches is "closely
guarded").
25. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 81-85 (2001) (striking down the drug testing of pregnant women at a
public hospital because the primary purpose of the testing was to gather evidence
for police investigations); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38, 40 (2000)
(finding a suspicionless search roadblock system unconstitutional because the state
could show no legitimate special need for the roadblock beyond law enforcement).
26. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318).
27. Id. (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321).
28. Id. at 71-74.
29. Id. at 70-74.
30. Id. at 71-73.
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criminal charges, and logistics of arrest. 31 The Ferguson Court
also noted that the policy did not discuss the "special need" of
"protecting the health of both mother and child," as purported by
the government.32 The extensive involvement of local police in the
implementation of the suspicionless searches also factored into the
Ferguson Court's analysis.33 Based on these factors, the Court
held:
[T]he threat of law enforcement may ultimately have been
intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary
purpose of [the hospital's] policy was to ensure the use of those
means .... Because law enforcement involvement always
serves some broader social purpose or objective... virtually
any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized
under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely
in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.
Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment. 34
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,35 decided the same term
as Ferguson, the Court struck down a roadblock program designed
to discover and interdict illegal narcotics. 36  The program
instructed police officers to stop and search a predetermined
number of vehicles on certain roads throughout the city.37 In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the general
crime-control purpose of the search regime did not qualify as a
special need.38  The Edmond majority distinguished this
roadblocking scheme from others that it had upheld in the past,39
stating that the past roadblocks had been implemented for special
needs purposes such as immediate protection of public safety from
drunk drivers. 40  In contrast, the Court indicated that the
"primary purpose" of the search at issue in Edmond "was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."41 Ultimately the Court
held that because of this "general interest in crime control," the
City did not establish a special need to perform searches without
individualized suspicion. Therefore, the roadblock program
31. See id. at 82.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 83-84 (footnote omitted).
35. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
36. Id. at 47-48.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 41-44, 48.
39. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding the state's use of
a sobriety checkpoint).
40. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39.
41. Id. at 38, 41-42.
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contravened the Fourth Amendment. 42
C. Reasonableness Balancing: Balancing the Special Need
Against the Individual's Expectation of Privacy
Once the Supreme Court has identified a special need beyond
general law enforcement, it engages in a reasonableness balancing
inquiry to determine whether the government's method of
satisfying its special need is "reasonable" within the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment. 43 The Court has identified reasonableness as
the "touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment. 44  The Court
determines the reasonableness of a government search or seizure
"by balancing [the government practice's] intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." 45  The "legitimate
governmental interests" are the special needs identified by the
first step of the analysis.46 This reasonableness balancing inquiry
implies that the more a government practice intrudes on a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy, the stronger the
government's special needs interest must be.
The Court has identified two levels of suspicion below the
normal probable cause standard that pass constitutional muster in
different circumstances. 4 7 The lowest level of suspicion recognized
is essentially a suspicionless standard. 48 The Court has recognized
that suspicionless searches intrude to an extreme on an
individual's privacy and are "the very evil the Fourth Amendment
was intended to stamp out."49 Therefore, the Court closely guards
the category of constitutional suspicionless searches, allowing such
searches only in the most demanding circumstances. 50
42. Id. at 41-42.
43. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
44. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
45. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654
(1979))).
46. Id. at 653.
47. See Matthew S. Roberson, "Don't Bother Knockin'... Come On In!" The
Constitutionality of Warrantless Searches As Condition of Probation, 25 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 181, 189 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding
the random drug testing of high school student athletes based on the school's
special needs of maintaining order and preventing drug addiction among student
athletes).
49. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2203 (Steven, J., dissenting) (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-30 (1886)).
50. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001) (citing Chandler v.
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The Court has identified the second level of suspicion as the
"reasonable suspicion" standard. 51 This level of suspicion does not
require a warrant, but it does require the searching officer to
articulate reasonable grounds in order to justify a search.52 Often
the Court will allow the person administering the search to
incorporate her own experiences on the job when determining
whether reasonable grounds for a search exist. 53
When the reasonable balancing calculus tips in favor of a
government agency applying either a suspicionless standard or a
reasonable suspicion standard, the Court normally requires other
procedural safeguards to protect those intruded upon from a
government agent's discretionary use of authority. Recognizing
that there are situations "in which the balance of interests
precludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized
suspicion,"' the Court stated "other safeguards are generally relied
upon to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the
field[.]"'54
The Court has applied the special needs doctrine and the
accompanying reasonableness balancing to a wide variety of
contexts including situations involving students,55 government
workers, 56 involuntary participants in roadblocks, 57 and public
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)) (recognizing that the category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches is "closely guarded").
51. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
52. See id. at 878; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) ("[T]he issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.") (citations and footnotes
omitted). But see Griffin, 438 U.S. at 883-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that even with a "reasonable suspicion" standard, a search warrant should still be
required).
53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ("[I]n determining whether the officer acted
reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.").
54. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (quoting Camara v.
Mun. Court of City and County of San Franscisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532
(1967)).(citations omitted); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US. 873,
882 (1975) ('The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands
something more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the
Government.").
55. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-47 (1985) (upholding a
school official's search of a minor student's purse for cigarettes and the admission
of marijuana discovered inside based on the school's special need to establish
discipline and maintain order and the official's reasonable suspicion that the
student had been smoking in the lavatory).
56. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-33 (1989)
(upholding blood, breath, and urine testing of railroad employees based on the
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hospital patients.5 8 The Court has recognized special needs such
as a high school's need to establish discipline and maintain
order,59 and the government's special need to regulate the conduct
of railroad employees in order to ensure public safety. 60
Nevertheless, as noted in the discussion of the Ferguson and
Edmond cases above, the Court has also rejected government
claims of special needs when it has found that the searches are
performed for the purpose of general crime control. 61 The Court
normally is reluctant to expand the special needs category,
defining it as "closely guarded."62
D. The Court's Application of the Special Needs Doctrine and
Reasonableness Balancing Test to the Context of
Probationers and Parolees
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court first recognized a state's
special need to closely supervise probationers and parolees.63
Joseph Griffin moved to suppress evidence found during a
warrantless search conducted by probation officers.6 The officers
searched Griffin's house because they had received a tip from a
police detective that the probationer may have had an illegal
weapon in his home. 65 The probation officers found a gun, which
later served as the basis of Griffin's conviction for a state-law
weapons offense. 66
The Griffin Court upheld the Wisconsin regulation allowing a
probation officer to search a probationer's home based on a
reasonable suspicion that the probationer is in possession of
contraband. 67 The Griffin Court specifically held that "[a] State's
operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school,
government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated
industry, presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement
government's special need to regulate the conduct or railroad employees in order to
ensure public safety); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989).
57. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
58. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001).
59. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-47.
60. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-33.
61. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-85; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
62. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77.
63. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987).
64. Id. at 871-72.
65. Id. at 871.
66. Id. at 870.
67. Id. at 880.
[Vol. 25:2
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that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-
cause requirements."68 The Court further stated:
A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable
degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate
rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a
supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay
inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult
for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of
misconduct, and would reduce the deterrent effect that the
possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create. 69
The Court recognized the State's special need to closely
supervise probationers and parolees based on the its dual
legitimate interests in reducing recidivism and in rehabilitating
probationers and parolees.70 First, the Court found that more
intensive supervision can reduce recidivism among parolees and
protect the public from a predictable danger. 71 Second, the Court
agreed with the argument that closer supervision provides further
encouragement for a probationer's rehabilitation. 72
When considering the Fourth Amendment rights of
probationers, the Court found that Wisconsin's suspicion standard
was reasonable under the circumstances. 73  Probationers and
parolees do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled .... 74 Instead, probationers and parolees enjoy only a
"conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions." 75 This enabled the Court to hold that a
probationer's privacy rights were outweighed by the government's
special needs interest. 76
The Griffin Court also concentrated on the fact that a
probation officer conducted the search, 77 recognizing that a search
conducted by a probation officer based on reasonable grounds
differs from a police officer conducting a search on reasonable
68. Id. at 873-74.
69. Id. at 876 (citations omitted); see also id. at 877-78 (concluding that the
warrant requirement is constitutionally inseparable from the probable cause
standard, and thus rejecting Justice Blackmun's dissenting argument that the
State's reasonable grounds standard should still require a warrant).
70. Id. at 873-75.
71. Id. at 874.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 880.
74. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
75. Id. (equating parolee status with probationer status) (quoting Morissey, 408
at 480 (1972)).
76. See id. at 880.
77. Id. at 876-77.
2007]
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grounds. 78 A probation officer not only considers the public safety
when conducting her duties, she also is supposed to consider the
welfare of her probationer; 79 however, a police officer conducting a
search of a probationer will not necessarily have the probationer's
welfare in mind.80 The Court used this distinction to further
support its finding that a probation officer can conduct searches of
a probationer's home based on a reasonable suspicion.81
Later, in United States v. Knights,8 2 the Court upheld a
search of a probationer's home by a police officer based on a
reasonable suspicion that the search would yield evidence of a
crime.83 A California district court had sentenced Knights to
probation for a drug offense.8 4 The probation order contained a
condition that he would "[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of
residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or
without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause
by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."8 5 The search
at issue occurred when a police officer inspected Knights' home
after discovering evidence in his truck possibly connecting him to
recent arson attempts.8 6
Upon finding the probation condition "salient" after using the
totality of the circumstances analysis,8 7 the Court defined the
issue as "whether the Fourth Amendment limits searches
pursuant to this probation condition to those with a 'probationary'
purpose."88 While acknowledging that the Griffin Court had held
that a search of a probationer based on a reasonable suspicion
satisfied a "special need,"8 9 the Knights Court chose not to engage




81. Id. at 879-80.
82. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
83. See id. at 121.
84. Id. at 114.
85. Id. (quoting the probation order).
86. See id. at 115.
87. See id. at 118 (stating explicitly that this case did not decide "whether
Knights' acceptance of the search condition constituted consent..."). But see Sean
M. Kneafsey, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers: What Remains After
Waiving Their Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures?, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1237, 1256-59 (1995) (arguing that a probationer's acceptance
of the probation requirements did constitute consent and the government did not
need to show a special need to bypass the warrant requirement).
88. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 116 (2001).
89. See id. at 117.
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Griffin holding did not apply to Knights90 and proceeded
immediately to apply a reasonableness balancing test.91 The
Court decided the case using a "general Fourth Amendment
approach of 'examining the totality of the circumstances."'92 Citing
Griffin, the Court found that Knights, as a probationer, had a
limited expectation of privacy. 93 The Court again concluded that
the government had valid interests in reducing recidivism among
probationers and encouraging their rehabilitation. 94 Finally, it
held that after balancing the government's interest against
Knights' limited expectation of privacy, a reasonable suspicion
requirement satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.95 The Court declined to address whether a
suspicionless search conducted under the same probation
requirement would have satisfied the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement.96
II. Samson v. California:97 The Court Strays From Its
Special Needs Precedent.
In Samson v. California, the Court held that an application of
reasonableness balancing justified a police officer's suspicionless
search of a parolee under the Fourth Amendment. 98 Donald
Samson was on state parole in California on September 6, 2002,
for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 99 That afternoon,
Officer Rohleder of the San Bruno Police Department saw Samson
on the street.100 Officer Rohleder, aware of Samson's parolee
status and believing that Samson had an at large warrant for his
arrest, stopped Samson for questioning. 10 1 Samson told Rohelder
that he did not have an outstanding warrant and that he "was in
90. Id. at 117-18.
91. Id. at 118-20; see also Jonathan T. Skrmetti, The Keys to the Castle: A New
Standard for Warrantless Homes Searches in United States v. Knights, 122 S. Ct.
587 (2001), 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 1201 (2001) (arguing that society's interests
have increased in weight in the Court's reasonableness balancing calculus and that
the Knights Court did not decide its case under the special needs doctrine in order
to streamline its Fourth Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence).
92. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
93. See id. at 119.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 121.
96. Id. at 120 n.6.
97. Samson I, supra note 1; Samson II, supra note 1.
98. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2197, 2202.





good standing with his parole agent."10 2 Rohleder confirmed that
Samson did not have an outstanding warrant,10 3 but then searched
Samson based on his parole condition allowing for suspicionless
searches.10 4 Officer Rohleder explained why he searched Samson,
stating "I believe that being [a] parolee, that [Samson] needs to
make sure he's still obeying the laws. It's a privilege for him to be
out here."10 5 The officer also testified "that he did not search all
parolees 'all the time,' but does conduct parole searches 'on a
regular basis' unless he has 'other work to do' or already 'dealt
with' the parolee."10 6  Officer Rohleder further testified that he
intended to discharge Samson "if he had nothing on him illegal."10 7
The search turned up a plastic baggie containing
methamphetamine in a cigarette box inside Samson's breast
pocket.108 Officer Rohelder placed Samson under arrest. 10 9
A California trial court denied Samson's motion to suppress
the evidence resulting from Officer Rohleder's suspicionless
search.110 On appeal, the First District of the California Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that "the
search was lawful pursuant to a condition of defendant's parole." '111
Quoting controlling California Supreme Court precedent, the
appellate court held that society did not recognize that Samson, as
a parolee, had a legitimate expectation of privacy. 112 The court
ruled that if the state imposed a suspicionless parole condition,
such searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as
long as they were not "arbitrary, capricious or harassing."113 The
court stated that a search based on this parole condition would not
be found arbitrary, capricious or harassing unless "the motivation
for the search is wholly arbitrary, when it is based merely on a
whim or caprice or when there is no reasonable claim of a
102. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000) ("Any inmate who is
eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter shall agree in writing to be
subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of
the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.").







112. Id. at *2 (citing People v. Lewis, 74 Cal. App. 4th 662, 667-68 (1999) (citing
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 753-54 (1998))).
113. Id. at *2 (quoting Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th at 752).
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legitimate law enforcement purpose.114 The appellate court
determined Officer Rohleder did not violate this standard because
he had a "legitimate law enforcement purpose" for this search:
ensuring that Samson was "still obeying the laws."115
The United States Supreme Court defined the issue
presented as "whether a condition of release can so diminish or
eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy
that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not
offend the Fourth Amendment."" 6  For the first time in a
probationer/parolee context, the Court upheld a suspicionless
search under a reasonableness balancing test.117 Citing Knights,
the Court explained it would apply its "general Fourth
Amendment approach" by examining the "totality of the
circumstances."' 18 It further clarified that this meant "assessing,
on one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests."'1 9
In an important footnote in this decision, the Court justified its
decision not to address "whether California's parole search
condition [was] justified as a special need under Griffin v.
Wisconsin... because our holding under general Fourth
Amendment principles renders such an examination
unnecessary."120
The Court articulated its reasoning concerning Samson's
expectations of privacy as a parolee, as well as the legitimate
government interests recognized under the reasonableness
balancing analysis. 121 Relying on its holdings in Knights, the
Samson Court first recognized that probationers enjoyed a
diminished expectation of privacy because of their status.122 The
Court further held that on the continuum of punishment, parolees
114. Id. at *3 (quoting People v. Cervantes, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1404, 1408 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002)).
115. Id.
116. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2196.
117. Id. at 2202.
118. Id. at 2197 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001))
(internal quotation omitted).
119. Id. (quoting Knights, 534 at 118-19) (internal quotation omitted).
120. Id. at 2199 n.3. This footnote also indicated that the Court was not deciding
this case under the doctrine of consent. The Court arguably could have based its
decision in Samson on its doctrine of consent, as defined in Shneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). This Article does not specifically address issues
surrounding the consent doctrine.
121. See id. at 2197-2202.
122. Id. at 2197.
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"have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to
imprisonment."'1 23  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that
Samson "did not have an expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as legitimate.' 1 24 Thus, the scale of reasonableness
balancing weighed less in Samson's favor than it had weighed for
the probationer in Knights or Griffin. The conditions placed on a
parolee, such as the suspicionless search condition at issue in this
case, reflected her diminished expectation of privacy. 125
The Court continued to recognize the legitimate government
interests of parolee recidivism and rehabilitation, 126  deeming
these interests "substantial" in contrast to Samson's Fourth
Amendment rights. 127 The Court noted that California had a
particularly strong interest in the reduction of recidivism
considering the empirical evidence that the government presented
in the case.128 Suspicionless searches were an effective way for
California to combat its high rate of recidivism and such searches
did not hinder "the reintegration of parolees into productive
society."'129 A higher standard of suspicion, such as the reasonable
suspicion standard upheld in Knights and Griffin and urged by
Samson, "would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate
searches and conceal criminality."'130 Recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment "imposes no irreducible requirement of such
[individualized] suspicion,"'131 the Court found the fact that other
jurisdictions held authorities to an individualized suspicion
standard of "little relevance" to California's supervisory system, as
long as that system was within the reasonableness limits of the
Constitution.132
The Court further held that California's prohibition of
"arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches" of probationers and
parolees provided sufficient protection against unbridled police
123. Id. at 2198.
124. Id. at 2199; see also id. at 2198 n.2 (noting that the Court's holding in this
case clearly does not imply that parolees are more akin to prisoners than
probationers).
125. Id. at 2199.
126. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2200-02.
127. Id. at 2200.
128. Id. ("California's parolee population has a 68-to-70 percent recidivism
rate.").
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2201.






III. The Samson Court Incorrectly Departed from Its
Special Needs Precedent in Order to Uphold the
Suspicionless Search of Parolees
A. California's Challenge of Regulating Its Large Parolee
Population
California has over 118,000 paroleesl 3 4 -a large population
for the state to monitor and control. Nevertheless, the challenge of
reducing recidivism and promoting the rehabilitation of parolees
does not justify dismissing the principles of the Fourth
Amendment and the Court's long-standing precedent of closely
scrutinizing suspicionless search standards. 35 If it were a proper
justification, the search regime permitting the suspicionless drug
testing of pregnant women should have passed muster since it
would protect a large population of both women and children. 136
By threatening the privacy rights of a politically weak minority
group, such as parolees, the entire population's privacy rights are
potentially compromised. 37  Following the reasoning of the
Edmond Court, unless ordinary crime control is distinguished
from special needs searches of parolees, suspicionless searches
might become "a routine part of American life."' 38  This is
particularly true for a parolee. 139
133. Id. at 2202 (quoting People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 752 (Cal. 1998).
134. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, PAROLE
COuNTS - DECEMBER 31, 2006, at 6 (2007).
135. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-86 (2001) (holding the
suspicionless search regime unconstitutional despite the State's articulated,
legitimate interest in the health of the mother and unborn child).
136. See id.
137. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV.
125, 192 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (suggesting that encroachments on the
privacy rights of parolees should be of concern to law-abiding citizens). It also is
important to note that California parolees do not have the right to vote, therefore
they are completely excluded from the political process that defines their rights.
See also Maya Harris, Slavery to Imprisonment, Disenfranchisement Plagues
America's Ballot Box, ACLU OF N. CAL, Dec. 1, 2005, at 10 (noting that California is
one of four states that disenfranchises parolees).
138. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
139. See also Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 192 n.62 ("It is ironic that a state
that was the leader in rehabilitative justice, social reform, and restorative
community programs now suffers from such a failure of imagination that the only
solution to recidivism seems to be the threat of suspicionless searches.").
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B. The Samson Court Should Have Applied the Special
Needs Doctrine Before Proceeding to the Reasonableness
Balancing Inquiry
Prior to the holdings in Samson and Knights, the special
needs doctrine served as an important gateway for the Court's
analysis before it engaged in a Fourth Amendment reasonableness
balancing. 40 The Court strictly applied the special needs doctrine
in order to avoid expanding the application of the Fourth
Amendment analysis.' 41 The Samson Court severely altered the
purpose of the special needs doctrine when it stated that it did not
need to "address whether California's parole search is justified as
a special need under Griffin v. Wisconsin, because our holding
under general Fourth Amendment principles renders such an
examination unnecessary."'142 The special needs doctrine should
have served as a preliminary test before the Samson Court
engaged in the reasonableness balancing calculus. 143 The Samson
decision enlarges the states' ability to circumvent the probable
cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment by not
requiring them to assert a special need beyond law enforcement.
Now, states simply can assert the reasonableness of a warrantless
search. 144 If the Court applied the special needs doctrine, it could
have reversed the dangerous modern judicial trends of expanding
the application of reasonableness balancing and of creating larger
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirements. 145
The suspicionless search at issue in Samson imposed a
greater intrusion upon the parolee's privacy than the reasonable
140. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
141. See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 376-
80 (2002) (discussing the application of the special needs doctrine in the Edmond
and Ferguson cases, which seemed to imply that the Court did not want to extend
the application of reasonableness balancing beyond its previous limits).
142. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2199 n.3 (citations omitted).
143. See id. at 2202-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
144. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2202-04; see also Jennifer Y. Buffaloe,
"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the
Warrant Preference Rule, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 530 n.10 (1997) (noting that
the exceptions to the warrant and probable cause standards are numerous).
145. See Buffaloe, supra note 144, at 530-31 (arguing that special needs doctrine
itself is so far reaching that it could turn the warrant preference rule "on its
head').; see also Frase, supra note 141, at 380 (arguing that the Edmonds and




suspicion search in Knights.146 This higher degree of intrusion
increased the importance of the Court's application of the special
needs doctrine. 147  Prior to Samson, the Court had closely
scrutinized suspicionless searches because of their intrusive
nature and had rejected such regimes in both Ferguson and
Edmond.148  The gravity of the intrusion presented by the
suspicionless search in Samson warrants a return to the special
needs doctrine analysis in the context of probationers and
parolees. 149
C. Suspicionless Searches of Parolees Conducted by Police
Officers are Not Divorced from California's General
Interest in Law Enforcement
Cases applying the special needs doctrine have conveyed a
clear message: general law enforcement purposes do not satisfy
the special needs doctrine. 150 These cases also have provided
many examples of searches, such as those at issue in Ferguson and
Edmond discussed in Part II, where the Court has identified a
high degree of law enforcement involvement to indicate a general
law enforcement purpose. 151 In Ferguson, even the peripheral
involvement of police in conducting the searches, collecting the
evidence, and prosecuting women who tested positive to illegal
drug use was enough to indicate that law enforcement constituted
the "primary purpose" of the search.152 As the argument below
will illustrate, law enforcement clearly constituted the primary
purpose of the search at issue in Samson, and the Court's decision
should have concluded with the application of the special needs
analysis. 153
146. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2197.
147. See id. at 2204-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001); Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). But see Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (allowing for suspicionless drug testing of certain U.S.
Customs Service employees).
149. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987); cf. Jonathan T.
Skrmetti, supra note 91, at 1213 (noting that the Knights decision reflected "an
increased emphasis on the government's interest" in the reasonableness balancing
analysis and predicting that the "inviolability of the home" would be reduced by the
decision).
150. See Buffaloe, supra note 145, at 531 ("Although special needs cases cover a
broad range of situations, they are linked by virtue of the fact that in each case the
government actor is someone other than a police officer searching for evidence to
support a criminal prosecution.").
151. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-86; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
152. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82.
153. See id. at 85-86; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
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The Griffin Court found that law enforcement was not the
primary purpose of the search at issue because a probation officer
conducted the search with reasonable suspicion and her
supervisor's permission. 5 4 This finding aligned the Griffin Court's
decision with other special needs cases where the primary purpose
of the searches at issue was not law enforcement. 155
The difference between the role of a probation (or parole)
officer and the role of a police officer played an important role in
the context of conducting searches. 156 Probation officers have a
dual charge-the interests of society, while also considering the
interests of a probationer or parolee. 57  A probation officer
maintains this delicate balance by developing a close relationship
with the probationers and parolees placed in their charge.Ss In
contrast, a police officer has one primary purpose: to enforce the
law.159 A police officer's general obligation to protect the interests
of society as a whole-and no other obligation-dictates his
interactions with a probationer or parolee. 60 Even if a police
officer intends to ensure that a parolee was conforming to her
parole restrictions, and thereby the law, it would be difficult to
distinguish how such intent differs from a general law
enforcement purpose. When law enforcement motives appear to
mix with other motives, such as enforcing parole restrictions, the
Ferguson decision indicates that the Court would find that law
enforcement was a primary motive.161
The facts in Samson I clearly indicate that Officer Rohleder
searched Samson for law enforcement purposes. Officer Rohleder
stated that he needed to make sure Samson was "still obeying the
laws."'162 He further stated that he intended to discharge Samson
"if he had nothing on him illegal."' 63  In other words, Officer
Rohleder indicated that he would not have arrested Samson had
154. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879 (dispatching with the warrant requirement for
probation officers in certain situations).
155. Id.
156. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court should not distinguish between probation and parole status for the
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis). For purposes of this argument, the role
of a probation officer and the role of a parole officer are assumed to be analogous.
157. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75.
158. Id. at 876-77.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81-82 (2001).




he not been carrying an illegal substance on his person.164 Thus,
in no uncertain terms, Officer Rohleder intended to enforce the
law. In fact, the California appellate court specifically held that
Officer Rohleder had a "legitimate law enforcement purpose" to
perform this search. 165 The special needs doctrine would not have
permitted this high level of law enforcement involvement. 166 The
Supreme Court may well have recognized this reality and
dismissed the doctrine with a footnote in order to allow the search
to stand.1 67
Additionally, the proceedings that took place after Samson's
arrest indicate that his status as a parolee was secondary to law
enforcement considerations. According to the California Penal
Code, "[a] parole may not be suspended or revoked for commission
of a nonviolent drug possession offense," but, instead, the parolee
should participate and complete "an appropriate drug treatment
program."1 68 In other words, had Samson's compliance with his
parole conditions been the main focus of Officer Rohleder's
investigation, California would have placed him in a drug
rehabilitation program, adding completion of the program as
another parole condition. 169 Samson was not placed in a drug
rehabilitation program; instead, he was charged with a new
offense. 170
IV. California's "Arbitrary, Capricious, or Harassing,1171
Standard Does Not Provide a Sufficient Safeguard for
Parolees Against a Police Officer's Abuse of Discretion
Even when suspicionless searches have been recognized as a
special need, the Court has never recognized the validity of such
searches without requiring that these exceptions have a regulatory
scheme to ensure fair, non-arbitrary application. 172 Prior to the
164. See id.
165. See id. at *3.
166. See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001); Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
167. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2204 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, (2001)) ("It is no accident, then, that when
we later upheld the search of a probationer by a law enforcement officer (again,
based on reasonable suspicion) we forewent any reliance on the special needs
doctrine.").
168. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3063.1(a) (West 2006).
169. Id.; see Brief for the Petitioner at 36, Samson I, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (Nov. 28,
2005) (No. 04-9728).
170. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 36.
171. California v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (1998).
172. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Samson decision the Court had often applied this principle to
invalidate suspicionless searches that were not sufficiently
curtailed by regulatory procedure. 173 When the Court has upheld
suspicionless searches, it has done so with a careful analysis of the
searches at issue, guaranteeing that sufficient safeguards were in
place to discourage the arbitrary application of the search
policy. 174
In California v. Reyes, 175 the California Supreme Court
upheld suspicionless searches of parolees as long as the search was
not "arbitrary, capricious or harassing."'176 The United States
Supreme Court upheld this standard in its analysis of Samson's
case.177
No party has ever successfully argued that a suspicionless
search has violated this standard.' 7s This powerful statistic, when
considered in light of the results of cases such as Samson,
indicates that police officers can easily satisfy the standard by
arguing the search was conducted for a law enforcement purpose
due to the suspect's parolee status.179 These results place a large
amount of discretionary power in the hands of California police
officers to search 80 California's large parolee population.' 8 ' Such
173. See, e.g., U. S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (finding a roving
border patrol scheme unreasonable because of the unlimited discretion placed in
the hand of the border patrol officers); see also U.S. v. U.S.D.C., 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972) ("[hose charged with... investigative.., duty should not be the sole
judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.").
174. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667
(1989) (upholding automatic drug tests because they were performed in a non-
arbitrary manner); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871-73 (1987) (upholding
probationer search standard because the searches were performed by probation
officers with a reasonable suspicion and their supervisors' permission).
175. 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998).
176. Id.
177. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2202.
178. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 20; see also Transcript of
Oral Argument, at 24, Samson I, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (No. 04-9728) (showing that
Petitioner claims that between 100 and 200 California cases have upheld this
standard, indicating that it is "an empty, vacuous standard"). But see id. at 24-
25,(suggesting that the possibility that California courts have upheld this standard
because there has "never been a case of a harassing search of a parolee").
179. Samson II, supra note 1, at * 3; see Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169,
at 20 (arguing that "[s]o long as the officer states that the motivation for the search
is related to the 'legitimate law enforcement purpose' of searching for evidence of
criminal activity, the search is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing under
California's standard"); see also Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 189 (arguing
that it would be surprising if a California court ever disqualified a search because
the standard is incredibly malleable and inquires into the subjective knowledge of
the police officer that the suspect is a parolee).
180. See Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 189.
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power should not be placed in the hands of police officers without
stronger procedural safeguards than those provided by the
"arbitrary, capricious or harassing"182 standard.
The "arbitrary, capricious or harassing"18 3 standard approved
by the California courts lacks bite as a sufficient procedural
safeguard against the arbitrary use of police power for several
reasons. First, it calls upon police officers to apply an entirely
different standard for searches with parolees than with other
people. While the search may be "suspicionless," it may not be
arbitrarily conducted. As Professor Richard Frase explains, "police
and trial courts cannot be expected to engage in complex
balancing ... in every case .... 1 8 4 The police officers are required
to apply yet another standard into their already confusing
repertoire of standards, which includes probable cause and
reasonable suspicion. 8 5 The California courts have not helped
police by providing broad, circular definitions of this muddy
standard.18 6 Officer Rohleder's statement that he did "not search
all parolees 'all the time,' but does conduct parole searches 'on a
regular basis" unless he has 'other work to do' or already 'dealt
with' the parolee"'8 7 exemplifies the arbitrary and discretionary
manner in which the ambiguous "arbitrary, capricious or
harassing" standard can be used and still pass muster. Police
forces, whose resources are already spread thin, cannot be
expected to correctly and non-arbitrarily apply this additional and
confusing standard. 8 8
181. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 15, Samson I, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (Jan. 13,
2006) (No. 04-9728).
182. California v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 449 (Cal. 1998).
183. Id.
184. See Frase, supra note 141, at 408 (2002). But cf. Skrmetti, supra note 91, at
1201 (arguing that the Knights decision simplified the Court's Fourth Amendment
reasonableness balancing. The arbitrary, capricious, or harassing standard would
be a simplification along those lines).
185. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 21 (quoting United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
The Court has said: "We do not think that the Fourth Amendment's
emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent with the creation of a third
verbal standard in addition to 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause."'
The Court explained that in "dealing with a constitutional requirement of
reasonableness.., subtle verbal gradations may obscure rather than
elucidate the meaning of the provision in question."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
186. See Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 188.
187. Samson II, supra note 1, at *1.
188. See Frase, supra note 141, at 333; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra
note 169, at 21-22, (arguing that the reasonable suspicion standard is preferable to
the subjective arbitrary standard because it is easier for police officers to apply and
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Another reason the "arbitrary, capricious or harassing"
standard upheld by the Samson Court should fail is that it calls
upon police officers to distinguish between parolees and
probationers in order to perform these suspicionless searches.18 9
This is a difficult and improbable task for police officers to engage
in daily.190  While there is a distinction between parole and
probation, 191 that distinction does not call for an entirely different
level of suspicion for searching parolees. 192 While alternatives to
this search regime will be discussed later in this Article, it
currently is enough to say that the same level of suspicion should
be required to search both probationers and parolees. 193 Officers
should be allowed to distinguish between individuals based on
rational conclusions deduced from their past criminal records.
However, the bright line distinction that is appropriate in this
area of jurisprudence should not be drawn from the subtle
differences between probationers and parolees. 194
Finally, the "arbitrary, capricious or harassing" standard
may act as a catalyst for increased racial profiling and harassment
by police. 195  Racial minorities are over-represented among
California's parole population. For example, while African-
Americans comprised only 6.7% of California's population in
2000,196 they comprised 25.5% of the male parolee population and
29% of the female parolee population in 2004.197 Similar
discrepancies exist for other racial minorities. 198 Allowing for
it better protects parolees' rights).
189. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2198.
190. See Frase, supra note 141, at 333, 407 (suggesting that complex standards
are difficult for police personnel to apply in everyday situations and that simple,
bright-line rules are preferable).
191. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2197-98 (comparing probation status to
parole status).
192. See id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Frase, supra note 141, at 333; Edward J. Loya, Jr., Probationers,
Parolees, and the Fourth Amendment: Addressing Unanswered Questions, 35 CUMB.
L. REV. 101, 144 (2004) (suggesting that a suspicionless traffic stop standard for
probationers would be a method by which police officers might be able to further
police harassment and racial profiling).
196. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CALIFORNIA 2000: CENsUs 2000 PROFILE 2 (2002),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprofo-ca.pdf.
197. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., supra note 134, at 82.
198. For example, Hispanic felon parolees in California statistically were
overrepresented in 2005. Hispanic or Latino people comprised 32.4% of the state's
population in the 2000 census, but 39.9% of the felon parolees in 2005 were
Hispanic males. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 196, at 2 with
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., supra note 134, at 82.
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suspicionless searches likely will increase both unintentional 99
and intentional harassment of parolees who are also members of a
racial minority. Because of the enormous costs involved, police
will certainly not search every parolee with whom they come into
contact .200 Instead, it seems likely that police officers will use this
broad discretionary power in a "highly selective manner. 201
Allowing broad discretion ensures more frequent complaints of
racial profiling and police harassment.20 2
V. The California Probation Regulation That Allows
Suspicionless Searches of Probationers by Police
Officers Should Fail the Court's Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Balancing Test
Even if the Court had concluded that a police officer's search
satisfied a special need, such searches would still be unreasonable
under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing test.20 3
Under the test, the state's interest in performing the search are
weighed against the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy.204
In Samson I, California argued that it had two primary
interests in allowing its police officers to conduct suspicionless
searches of parolees: 1) reducing recidivism and 2) promoting
parolee rehabilitation. 205 While the Court has recognized both of
these interests as legitimate, they already are sufficiently
promoted and supported by the Court's decisions in both
Knights2 6 and Griffin.20 7
The reasonable suspicion requirement recognized in both
199. See Leading Cases, supra note 137, at 190-91 (suggesting that California's
policy could facilitate the unintentional harassment of parolees, especially if there
is something about the parolee (i.e. race or gang membership) that tends to attract
the attention of the police).
200. See Frase, supra note 141, at 333.
201. Id.; see also Samson II, supra note 1, at *1 (indicating that Officer Rohleder
did "not search all parolees 'all the time").
202. See Frase, supra note 141, at 333.
203. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that after finding a special need the Court should "turn to a
'balancing' test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this context") (quoting
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
204. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) ("[Ihe reasonableness of
a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.").
205. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2200.
206. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
207. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75.
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Knights and Griffin provides law enforcement and parole officers
with enough discretion to combat recidivism, allowing parolees to
be searched much more easily than the population at large. 208 By
eliminating the warrant and probable cause requirements for
parolees and probationers, law enforcement should be able to
combat the concern that parolees will be able to quickly dispose of
the evidence of their crimes and avoid detection.209 The reasonable
suspicion standard also provides a minimal objective guideline for
law enforcement officials to follow when performing a search.2 10
The reasonable suspicion standard provides the government with
sufficient flexibility to combat recidivsm. A suspicionless search
standard will only increase the arbitrary use of discretionary law
enforcement power. 211
The suspicionless search standard will also undermine the
rehabilitation of parolees. 21 2 The Griffin Court rightly placed a
strong emphasis on the importance of a parolee's or probationer's
relationship with her parole or probation officer. 213 Parole officers
are charged with protecting the parolee's interests and promoting
her rehabilitation into society. 21 4 Given the importance of this
relationship, the Griffin Court was hesitant to disrupt the trust
relationships that the parole officer has developed with her
parolees.215 The Samson Court failed to give these considerations
sufficient weight in its analysis.216  Permitting suspicionless
searches of parolees will foster an inherent distrust between
parolees and law enforcement. 217 This distrust likely will affect
parolees' relationships with their parole officers. Disturbing this
relationship, as the Griffin Court implied, will further hinder
parolees' reintegration into society.218
208. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75.
209. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 25.
210. See id. at 25-26.
211. See id.; Frase, supra note 141, at 333 (increasing flexibility or
reasonableness may lead to increased police abuse of discretionary power); Loya,
supra note 195, at 144 (suggesting that a suspicionless traffic stop standard for
probationers would be a method by which police officers might be able to further
police harassment and racial profiling).
212. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 23.
213. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876-77.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2303-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
Griffin's emphasis on the probationer officer's relationship with her clients and
criticizing the Samson Court's subsequent avoidance of the special needs doctrine).
217. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 23.
218. See id. at 23-24.
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The fact that all states (with the possible exception of North
Dakota) and the Federal government require a much higher
standard than California for searching parolees indicates that the
state's statutory blanket suspicionless search regime is
unnecessary to pursue its legitimate interests. 2 19 Although the
Court stated that the standards used in some other jurisdictions
are irrelevant to the reasonableness of California's standard,220 the
suspicionless search standard is impliedly rejected by the vast
majority of jurisdictions. 221  Though each jurisdiction should
certainly be able to impose its own proprietary standards, such
unanimity among jurisdictions should at least weigh into the
analysis as a measure of reasonableness. 222
When weighing a parolee's interests, the Court should also
recognize that parolees have a diminished, but not extinguished,
expectation of privacy.223 The Court did not state that parolees do
not have any legitimate expectation of privacy. Rather, it simply
stated that parolees have fewer expectations than probationers.224
While prisoners may be subjected to blanket suspicionless search
policies in order to ensure order in the prison system, the same
need for absolute control does not exist when parolees are allowed
to reenter society.225 Therefore, parolees' and probationers' lower
expectation of privacy should still be protected from the intrusion
of suspicionless searches. 226 This is especially true if, as argued
above, these searches are not found to effectively promote the
states' legitimate interests of reducing recidivism and promoting
parolee rehabilitation.
219. Id. at 22-31.
220. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2201.
221. Id.; see Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 22-31.
222. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 169, at 22-31.
223. See Samson I, supra note 1, at 2204-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that parolees have a higher expectation of privacy than prison inmates); see also
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) ("[Plrobation [or parole] is simply
one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible
punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a
few hours of mandatory community service.").
224. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2198.
225. See id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
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VI. Alternatives to the Broad Suspicionless Search
Allowance in Samson
There are several alternatives to the blanket suspicionless
search regime available to states which want to impose more strict
supervision over their parolee populations. One solution is to
require that the police officer articulate a reasonable suspicion in
order to search a parolee, but to allow the officer to consider the
parole status as a factor in articulating her suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. 227 Allowing consideration of this factor may appear
prejudicial toward parolees and probationers, but it is no more so
than other factors, such as past criminal record, or even past
reputation, that courts on a regular basis allow police officers to
consider in a reasonable suspicion analysis. 228
Allowing reasonable suspicion based on probationary status
may be less prejudicial than many of the already recognized
factors because it is an easier and more concrete determination. 229
Permitting consideration of a person's parole status as well as her
criminal record may also let officers "double count" a person's
criminal history while articulating reasonable suspicion factors. 230
Nevertheless, in these cases the court may always require a
showing of more factors that led to an actionable suspicion if it
feels such a showing is necessary.231 This standard would thus
better protect the rights of parolees than the "arbitrary, capricious
or harassing" standard.232 This standard also would cause less
confusion among law enforcement officials since it would not
require them to learn and follow an entirely new standard.233
A second alternative is to allow the courts to make
individualized determinations that certain parolees warrant a
suspicionless or random search conditions. 234  These searches
should be performed by the parolee's probation officer, thus
ensuring that the searches are not performed primarily for law
227. See Loya, supra note 195, at 108; see also id. at 108 n.50 (stating
"probationer or parolee status ... is probative of a broad variety of criminal
offenses."); WAYNE LA FAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 221 (3d. ed. 2000) ("It is
proper to take account of the suspect's past criminal record, though such a record
standing alone is never a basis for a stop.").
228. See Loya, supra note 1955, at 108-09.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 124.
231. Id.
232. California v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 449 (Cal. 1998).
233. See Frase, supra note 141, at 332-33.
234. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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enforcement purposes. 235  Courts would be required to make
specific findings concerning the seriousness of the parolee's crimes
and the parolee's threat to society.236 The state would have a more
articulable special need to control certain individuals because of
the proof of their greater propensity for recidivism. 237  If the
individualized suspicionless searches were performed by a parole
officer, knowledgeable of the parolee's life, character and
circumstances, it would provide necessary safeguards to prohibit
law enforcement from abusing a discretionary suspicionless search
power.238 Implementation of these requirements would provide
the parolee with two levels of protection from improper searches:
1) the judiciary who made the initial determination based on
articulable factors that a suspicionless search was necessary and
2) the parole officer who is supposed to have the parolee's best
interest in mind when performing any search. 239
A third alternative to the blanket suspicionless search is for
the state to set up a system for the random search of parolees. 240
For example, officers could conduct a suspicionless search of every
tenth parolee with whom they came into contact.24 1  States
probably would have to implement elaborate tracking systems in
order to ensure that officers did not search parolees arbitrarily and
simply claim that the search was justified under the random
search policy. 242 Such an elaborate system might prove expensive
and difficult to maintain; however, if a state were successful in
implementing a sufficient tracking system that ensured non-
arbitrary application, it arguably could be used for purposes other
than law enforcement. 243 When a parolee is searched on a random
basis, simply because of his parolee status, the state could make a
stronger argument that the searches were performed to ensure






240. Samson I, supra note 1, at 2207 ("[Tjhis might have been a different case
had a court or parole board imposed the condition at issue [i.e. the suspicionless
search condition] based on specific knowledge of the individual's criminal history
and projected likelihood of reoffending, or if the State had had in place
programmatic safeguards to ensure evenhandedness."); cf. Loya, supra note 195, at
127-45 (proposing that a regime of suspicionless stops of probationers and parolees
by police officers would pass constitutional muster).
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law enforcement purposes. 244 Of course, such arguments would
meet with criticism because the system would partially evade the
Griffin Court's focus on parole officers' special relationship to
parolees. 245 Nevertheless, a random system conceivably could
satisfy concerns that the searches be performed in a non-arbitrary
manner.246 It also seems plausible that such a system could be
implemented. The system would promote the state's interests,
while simultaneously satisfying the demands of the special needs
doctrine.
Conclusion
The country has yet to see the full effect of Samson v.
California on subsequent litigation. It is clear that the Court
deliberately circumvented the special needs doctrine in order to
uphold the suspicionless search at issue. Had it held the
suspicionless search unconstitutional, state legislatures would be
forced to go back to the drawing board to create laws and policies
that better conform with the demands of the Fourth Amendment.
While the liberty of the population at large has not been
threatened with suspicionless searches, the liberty of parolees in
California has been severely diminished and are now a part of
their everyday lives.
One can only hope that the Supreme Court eventually will
reverse the unprecedented and unjustified holding in Samson,
thereby forcing states such as California to consider alternatives to
a blanket suspicionless search standard to control their parolee
and probationer populations.
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